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BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE FORMER GOVERN-
MENT ATTORNEY AND ABA DISCIPLINARY
RULE 5-105(D)
William Ruckelshaus, director of the Environmental Protection
Agency from 1970 to 1973, upon his departure from the government in
1974, established his own law firm in Washington, D.C. The majority
of the firm's initial partners were former EPA officials, and in the
beginning a substantial number of its clients retained the firm to solve
problems with the agency. During 1974 and 1975, the firm contacted
the agency which Ruckelshaus had headed 178 times on behalf of
clients.'
Federal Trade Commissioner Stephen A. Nye left his government
office in 1976. During his tenure with the FTC, Nye received frequent
visits from members of the law firm representing Kennecott Copper
Corporation, which had been ordered by the FTC to sell off its $1.2
billion Peabody Coal subsidiary. Although Mr. Nye sympathized with
the company's efforts to reopen the case and amend the divestiture
order, his fellow commissioners did not budge. Mr. Nye now works for
the same Washington law firm which had previously come to him on
behalf of Kennecott.2
At the close of 1976, hearings were scheduled by the Food and
Drug Administration concerning the proposed withdrawal from the
market of a growth promotant for cattle. The makers of the growth
promotant were represented in the matter by Covington & Burling, a
prestigious Washington law firm whose membership includes Peter
Hutt, former assistant general counsel for the FDA. Attorneys for the
FDA had taken the position that Hutt, while at the FDA, had substan-
tial responsibility in the agency's reaching its decision to seek withdraw-
al of approval of the growth promotants; they had requested that
Covington & Burling withdraw from the matter.'
1. See Jenkins, Working Both Sides of the Court, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1977,
at 34, 35.
2. Id.
3. Letter from Robert M. Spiller, Jr., Associate Chief Counsel for Enforcement,
HEW, to Covington & Burling, Nov. 19, 1976, on file at the Hastings Law Journal.
Interestingly, Mr. Hutt was a partner of Covington & Burling before going to the
FDA. Furthermore, a present assistant general counsel of the FDA had attempted to
remain aloof from the issue of Covington & Burling's disqualification since he, too, is
a former member of that firm. Memo from Richard A. Merrill, Assistant General
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These accounts allege no wrongdoing on the part of the attorneys
involved. They serve merely to demonstrate the way in which Washing-
ton, D.C., lawyers gain power from government service and the way
they subsequently use it to their clients' advantage. The problem is
pervasive; although the above instances are illustrative, similar cases
may be found in almost every other government agency. Furthermore,
the problem is the same whether the former employer was the federal
government or a state or local government. Thus, although dilemmas
arise frequently in Washington with regard to a former federal govern-
ment attorney, they are present whenever a former government attorney
4
works for a firm which represents clients in matters similar to those with
which he dealt in his former government position.
In such situations, it is clear that the former government attorney
will be disqualified5 from participating in any matter over which he
exercised substantial responsibility. 6 This disqualification is mandated
by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B),7 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. 8  Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) is situated under Canon 9
dealing with avoiding the appearance of professional impropriety which,
as will be seen, is of paramount concern in this area of former govern-
Counsel, to William H. Taft, IV, General Counsel, HEW, Nov. 19, 1976, on file at the
Hastings Law Journal.
4. In this note, the term "former government attorney" refers to any attorney,
now employed in private practice, who previously was in government service, although
not necessarily in the capacity of an attorney.
5. If the attorney does not himself recognize the issue of disqualification, it can
be raised by the opposing counsel or by the court (or similar tribunal) itself. Disqualifi-
cation is generally appropriate where continuing representation would result in an actual
violation of a pertinent disciplinary rule.
6. See text accompanying notes 89-93, infra, for a discussion of what constitutes
substantial responsibility in a matter.
7. The Code of Professional Responsibility consists of three separate but interre-
lated parts:
"The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the pub-
lic, with the legal system and with the legal profession. ...
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objec-
tives toward which every member of the profession should strive. ...
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in char-
acter. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no law-
yer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action ....... Preliminary Statement,
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
8. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is binding on members of the
profession only in those jurisdictions which have specifically adopted the code. How-
ever, in those jurisdictions, including California, which have not adopted the code, it
may serve as persuasive authority and provide guidance for the courts, either in disciplin-
ary proceedings or when a motion has been made to disqualify an attorney from a pro-
ceeding.
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ment attorneys.' Specifically, DR 9-101(B) provides: "A lawyer
shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a government employee." The
more difficult question, however, is whether under existing guidelines
the former government attorney's firm may continue to represent the
client in the matter in which such attorney has been disqualified. Can-
on 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
exercise independent judgement on behalf of a client. Disciplinary Rule
5-105(D), located under Canon 5, provides:
If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate,
or any other attorney affiliated with him or his firm, may accept
or continue such employment.
Although on its face DR 5-105(D) is broad and absolute, it has been
subjected to differing interpretations; some interpretations would make
its impact limited and qualified as to the firms of disqualified former
government attorneys. This note will consider whether DR 5-105(D)
should be interpreted to require that the disqualification of a former
government attorney be extended to his firm. In dealing with this issue,
a brief history of the conflicting interpretations of DR 5-105(D) will be
given. Next, the policy considerations supporting both strict and quali-
fied interpretations of DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D) will be exam-
ined. These policy considerations will be weighed, and the note will
conclude that the correct interpretation of DR 5-105(D) is that stated
by the black letter of the rule itself: if a former government attorney is
disqualified, the disqualification of all members of his law firm is
absolute.
Recent Interpretations of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D)
The question of whether a former government attorney's disqualifi-
cation must inevitably lead to the disqualification of the firm with which
he is associated is one of recent concern. In 1974, the ABA amended
DR 5-105(D), broadening it considerably by disqualifying the firm
because of the disqualification of a member attorney under any discipli-
nary rule, and by extending the disqualification to any lawyer affiliated
with the disqualified attorney or firm. 10 Prior to 1974, the problem of
9. See notes 40-45 & accompanying text infra.
10. The text of DR 5-105(D) prior to the amendment stated: "If a lawyer is re-
quired to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no
partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPoNsmu..rrv (1972). The former DR 5-105(D) then, man-
dated disqualification of the firm in only one area-where the attorney had been dis-
qualified under DR 5-105 because of the proscription against representing differing inter-
ests.
However, even before 1974, disqualification of the entire firm had been recognized
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whether to disqualify the law firm of a disqualified former government
attorney had invoked little comment. However, shortly after the
amendment to DR 5-105(D), the problem was addressed in ethics
committee opinions by three bar associations: the ABA, the District of
Columbia Bar Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. The ABA opinion proposes a qualified interpretation of the
rule, which would require the disqualification of the firm only when the
disqualified former government attorney was not adequately "screened" a'
-or isolated-from the matter by the firm; the government agency
involved would make final decisions as to whether disqualification was
required. The District of Columbia Bar opinion, issued in draft form,
12
would require the disqualification of the entire firm any time a member
is disqualified under DR 9-101(B) and would thus totally preclude any
discretionary screening process. The New York interpretation is similar
to the ABA opinion in that it would allow screening in appropriate
circumstances. The New York opinion, however, leaves the final deci-
sion as to whether screening is adequate to a court or similar tribunal,
whereas the ABA opinion leaves the final decision to the government
agency involved. These interpretations will now be discussed in the
order in which they were published.
The ABA Opinion
In an attempt to soften the rule disqualifying the firm when a
as appropriate in situations other than that contemplated by former DR 5-105(D): "It
has long been recognized that the disqualification of one lawyer in an organization gen-
erally constituted disqualification of all affiliated lawyers .... ." ABA COMM. ON
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 342, at 1 n.2
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA OPINION 342], citing American Can Co. v. Citrus
Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370
F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), alf'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971); W. E. Bassett Co.
v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1962); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 169 (1937); id., No. 49 (1931); id., No. 33 (1931); id., No.
16 (1929); Kaplan, Forbidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 914, 926 (1956); Perkins,
The Federal Conflict-oI-Ilterest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 657, 660 (1957); 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1339 (1956).
11. "Screening," as used in this note, refers to the practice of isolating a disquali-
fied former government attorney from those matters which caused his disqualification
during the entire time his firm continues its involvement in such matter. Screening
necessarily encompasses exclusion of the attorney from any discussion, contact, or par-
ticipation in the matter and likewise prohibits any sharing in the remuneration attrib-
utable to the matter.
12. Efforts to adopt formally this draft opinion were apparently defeated when the
District of Columbia Bar Association members by mail ballot narrowly rejected the draft
opinion in December, 1976. However, proponents of an unqualified interpretation of
DR 5-105(D) are presently attempting to draft an amendment to the District of Colum-
bia's Code of Professional Responsibility which would embody the substance of the draft
opinion. Conflict of Interest: The Debate Heats Up, 63 A.B.A.J. 16 (1977).
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former government attorney in the firm is himself disqualified, the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in 1975 proposed
a clarification of the rule.'" In its formal opinion, the Ethics Committee
acknowledged the general rule requiring disqualification of the firm in
situations not involving former government attorneys."4  However, in
an attempt to distinguish the rule to be applied with regard to former
government attorneys, the committee cited the need not to thwart what it
considered to be the policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B).
The considerations in favor of disqualification were deemed to be: the
safeguarding of confidential governmental information from future use
against the government; the treachery of switching sides; 15 the need to
discourage government lawyers from handling particular assignments in
such a way as to encourage future private employment with regard to
those particular matters; and the professional benefit derived from
avoiding the appearance of evil. 1
Against these positive considerations supporting a strict interpreta-
tion of the rule, the committee believed it was important to weigh other
policy considerations "favoring a construction [of DR 9-101 (B)] in a
manner not to restrict unduly the lawyer's future employment . . .,,T
Those considerations supporting a narrow interpretation of the rules were
held to be: the possible restriction on government recruitment of
attorneys due to harsh restraints upon future practice by former govern-
ment attorneys; the prospect of a litigant using the rule as a mere tool to
deprive his opponent of competent counsel; and the possible needless
interference with the right of litigants to obtain the counsel of their
choice.' 8
Taking the position that application of DR 5-105(D) should not
thwart the policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B) and that a
strict application of DR 5-105(D) would accomplish precisely that, the
committee proposed an interpretation which would allow the govern-
13. See ABA OPINIoN 342, supra note 10. The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is not binding in those jurisdictions which have not specifically adopted it. See
note 8 supra. However, even where it has been adopted, opinions of the ABA Ethics
Committee are not binding and are merely advisory in nature. They do, however, serve
as a guide to what actions the ABA Committee deems acceptable. Failure to live up to
the minimum standards established by a Disciplinary Rule may result in the attorney's
being subjected to disciplinary proceedings, in which the ABA opinion may serve as
persuasive authority.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. The "treachery of switching sides" as used in this note refers to an attorney's
accepting employment which requires him to advocate a position adverse to a position
formerly advocated by him on behalf of another client. See notes 25-26, 64-70 & accom-
panying text infra.
16. See ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 3-4.
17. Id. at 4.
18. See id. at 4-5.
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ment agency involved19 to waive the rule if to its satisfaction, and to the
satisfaction of the firm, the disqualified attorney was adequately isola-
ted-or screened-both from participating in the matter and from shar-
ing in the fees attributable thereto." The committee felt that such
interpretation of the rule would minimize the restrictions on government
recruitment and enhance the opportunity for parties to obtain competent
counsel of their choice, particularly in specialized areas. Furthermore,
the opinion stated that disqualification of the firm would often result in
real hardship to the client if substantial work had been completed
regarding a particular matter prior to the time the government employee
joined the partnership or if the client had a history of relying on
representation by the firm.2
The ABA Ethics Committee also stated that the policy considera-
tions favoring disqualification could be realized by the less strict inter-
pretation. Without explaining how it was possible, the opinion stated
that the concern for confidences and switching sides could be adequately
satisfied by the less stringent application of DR 5-105(D). Further-
more, the need to discourage government lawyers from handling their
work with an eye toward future private employment and the need to
avoid the appearance of impropriety were fulfilled, in the committee's
view, by limiting the application of DR 5-105(D) to instances in which
a former government attorney had not been adequately screened.
The opinion concludes that whenever the government agency and
the firm are both satisfied that the screening measures employed have
effectively isolated the disqualified attorney from participating in the
particular matter and from sharing in the fees attributable to it and that
there is no appearance of impropriety, the firm will not be in violation of
DR 5-105(D) by continuing to represent the client. 21
District of Columbia Bar Draft Opinion
In direct opposition to the position taken by the ABA Ethics
Committee opinion stands a tentative draft opinion of the Committee on
Legal Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar.23  Unlike the ABA
19. This proposal by the ABA Ethics Committee apparently fails to take into con-
sideration the possibility that disqualification of a former government attorney under DR
9-101(B) may occur in a proceeding in which the government is not a party. The rule
of DR 9-101 (B) is as applicable to a matter involving two private parties as it is when
the government is a party, and the ABA Ethics Committee's opinion is deficient in not
providing analysis of such an instance.
20. See ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 12.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 12.
23. See Tentative Draft Opinion for Comment Inquiry 19, Dis-Ricr LAwYER, Fall
1976, at 39 [hereinafter cited as Draft Opinion].
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opinion, the District of Columbia draft opinion places great weight on
the appearance of impropriety, which it cites as responsible,, at least in
part, for the erosion of public confidence in the legal profession.24
This appearance may arise in a variety of situations, many of which also
evidence the underlying considerations given expression in the ABA
formal opinion. The draft opinion states that confidentiality per se is
not of major importance in the area of government attorneys, at least not
to the extent that it is for private attorneys. Because the government
should deal openly with its citizens and because its citizens should have
the right to speak out against perceived shortcomings of the government,
the concern for confidentiality is severely limited so long as the govern-
ment attorney speaks out in a public forum. The real concern when
speaking of confidentiality, according to the draft opinion, is that the
attorney with inside information may sell it to a particular client, so that
the client may have an advantage over others interested in the same
matter. Even if the attorney has in fact no secrets to sell, the appear-
ance of impropriety alone is of significant concern.
The District of Columbia draft opinion takes the position that the
former government attorney's switching sides is of particular concern
given that public perception of apparent impropriety is treated as the
primary evil to be guarded against. Although the ability to represent
opposing interests may be viewed by other attorneys with approbation,
the public is likely to view an attorney who switches sides "not only as
uncommitted, but as opportunistic, cynical, and even deceitful-pre-
pared to betray yesterday's client for the sake of today's fee."2 5 When
the lawyer switching sides previously had substantial responsibility in
representing the other side of a matter now in question, "it can be
expected to foster a lessening of regard for lawyers and thereby for the
administration of justice."2
The draft opinion cites and focuses upon the abuse of government
power, only touched upon in the ABA opinion, in three different
forms: first, the attorney while in government service may handle a
matter within his authority in such a way as to ingratiate himself with a
potential future employer. Second, the attorney's actions on a matter
may be influenced by the hope of creating subsequent private employ-
ment for himself, either to uphold or upset the position taken while in
government service. Third, the attorney may abuse his authority as a
government official to obtain discovery or other advantage to be used
against a party in a later private action. In each of these three situa-
tions, there is bound to be legitimate concern that the public will view
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 41.
26. Id.
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the attorney as using his government office improperly to advance his
own standing.
Another consideration noted by the District of Columbia draft
opinion is that employees still connected with a government agency may
have a tendency to show favoritism to a former employee. Even if no
favoritism is shown in fact, the draft opinion states that the appearance
of favoritism is inevitable and, again, highly undesirable.
The appearance of impropriety, rather than actual impropriety, is
again stressed in analyzing the final situation explored by the draft
opinion. The employment of former government attorneys by firms
representing interests antagonistic to those of the government may give
the impression that the private interest is hiring away key people in
order to "buy out" the opposition. This situation again may call into
question the willingness of attorneys to put personal gain above princi-
ple and may seriously impair the public's confidence in the profession.
The appearance of impropriety, then, is the dominant concern of
the District of Columbia draft opinion. Indeed, it states "[a] funda-
mental error in the recent ABA Formal Opinion 342 is the way in which
it denigrates concern with the appearance of professional improprie-
ty."27  Furthermore, the draft opinion notes that since the concern is
with the public's trust in the legal profession there is a need to recognize
that " 'subtleties' may escape 'an unsophisticated public,' "2 and it is
therefore essential that the concern be with the appearance that a course
of conduct may have in the eyes of the public rather than with the fact
of impropriety in a particular case.
29
The District of Columbia committee concedes that the undesirable
appearances would be eliminated, particularly with regard to switching
sides and abuse of power, in many situations where the former govern-
ment attorney is screened from participating in matters over which he
previously had substantial responsibility while in government service. It
nonetheless concludes that the appearance of favoritism shown to former
colleagues or of the attorney taking advantage of government secrets for
private clients requires disqualification of the firm. The District of
Columbia opinion points out that screening is an exception created by
the ABA Ethics Committee opinion that is provided for nowhere in the
Code of Professional Responsibility and presents five additional objec-
tions to the screening procedure. ° First, screening would not preclude
an agency from showing favoritism to the firm of a former colleague.
Second, there is no way to police the conduct of the firm to insure that
27. Id. at 40.
28. Id.
29. Id., citing General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649,
651 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. See Draft Opinion, supra note 23, at 40-41.
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the attorney does not abuse confidences gained while in government
service. Third, screening is irrelevant to the problem of hiring away key
personnel or to the government attorney's ingratiating himself with a
prospective employer. Fourth, to call upon agency attorneys to deter-
mine whether the procedures taken by a firm have adequately isolated the
former government attorney is to engage such agency attorneys in a
conflict of interest. The agency attorneys would be required to make
decisions which create the precedent which will govern them and be
cited by them when they later enter the private sector themselves. Fifth,
rather than avoiding the appearance of impropriety, screening com-
pounds it.
In. summary, the District of Columbia tentative draft opinion
argues that the primary concern is with the appearance of impropriety.
In fact, the draft opinion makes no mention of the effect that strict
application of DR 5-105(D) might have on government recruitment,
future private employment, or the litigant's right to competent counsel
of his own choice. Although conceding that screening would be ade-
quate to eliminate the appearances of impropriety in certain situations,
the District of Columbia draft opinion states that such a proposal does
violence to the text of the Code of Professional Responsibility and,
indeed, is unworkable.
New York City Bar Opinion
A third recent interpretation of DR 5-105(D) with regard to the
problem of the disqualified former government attorney was promulga-
ted by the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York.3 It adopted a position similar
to that proposed by the ABA. Like the ABA opinion, the New York
opinion cites the need to weigh a rule requiring automatic disqualifica-
tion of the partners and associates of the disqualified lawyer against
other important policy considerations.32 The New York opinion cited
several policy considerations militating against strict application of DR
5-105(D). The first was the concern with unnecessary or unjustified
restraints on individual employment. Second, blanket disqualification of
the firm may have an adverse affect on the ability of the government to
recruit qualified individuals. Third, the New York opinion noted the
obligation of the Bar to ensure that competent counsel is available to all
members of the public. Against these policy concerns the New York
opinion weighed the appearance of impropriety, which it recognized as
the appropriate factor favoring disqualification. Like the ABA opin-
31, See Opinion No. 899, 31 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 552 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Opinion 899].
32. See id. at 566.
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ion, the New York opinion concludes that when an attorney disqualified
under DR 9-101 (B) can be
effectively isolated from the handling of a matter by his partners
and associates, and where this isolation is sufficient to avoid appear-
ance of impropriety, then the disqualification should not extend
to the lawyer's partners and associates.
33
Unlike the ABA opinion, the New York opinion would not leave
the granting of this exception to the rule of strict disqualification in the
hands of the government agency. The agency would be given the
opportunity to scrutinize the screening methods employed and would be
allowed to raise any objections it believed were appropriate. However,
the New York opinion takes the position that leaving final authority for
disqualification to the government agency would insure that the authori-
ty would be exercised to disqualify the former government attorney's
firm in the majority of cases;3" out of fear of criticism and even possible
discipline should he lose the case, the government counsel would invari-
ably exercise his power to disqualify the firm. The New York opinion
proposes instead that although the agency should have an opportunity to
express its opinion on whether disqualification is appropriate, a court or
similar tribunal should be given the final authority to scrutinize the
effectiveness of the screening methods employed and to decide whether
such procedures adequately protect the public's interest.35
The New York opinion concludes with a reiteration of its position
that analysis of the factual circumstances involved in each case is
necessary to determine if disqualification is necessary. The opinion
suggests relevant questions to be asked in determining whether disquali-
fication is necessary.3 6 These include inquiry into whether there oc-
curred any discussions bearing on the matter between the disqualified
lawyer and other members of the firm, whether steps were taken to
insure the isolation of the disqualified attorney from the matter, whether
the firm itself made proper inquiries in determining that a particular
attorney was disqualified and therefore in need of isolation, and whether
the circumstances give rise to an inference that the attorney possessed
information of a confidential nature belonging to the government agen-
cy. Under the New York opinion answers to such questions should
determine whether, in each case, the facts justify disqualification of the
firm. However, the opinion concedes that even proper screening will
not cure the appearance of impropiety in every case.
37
33. Id.
34. Contra, Draft Opinion, supra note 23, at 42, which notes strong pressures on
government employees against enforcing disqualification.
35. See N.Y. Opinion 899, supra note 31, at 566-67.
36. Id. at 570-71.
37. Id. at 571.
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Thus, the current DR 5-105(D), which states clearly that a firm is
disqualified where a member is disqualified, has to date been subjected
to three differing interpretations where the member disqualified is a
former government attorney. One, the District of Columbia draft opin-
ion, accepts that the rule as written is subject to no qualification, arguing
that only through disqualification could the appearance of impropriety
be eliminated. The other two, the ABA opinion and the New York
opinion, propose a screening procedure in appropriate cases. The ABA
opinion would leave the final decision on disqualification to the agency
involved. The New York opinion, on the other hand, states that to do
this would result in disqualification in the majority of cases, and for this
reason it opts for a rule leaving the question of disqualification to the
courts.
Both the ABA and New York opinions analyze the meaning of DR
5-105(D) as applied to the law firm of a former government attorney
by means of balancing the factors in favor of absolute disqualification
against those factors in favor of a less strict rule of disqualification.
Both conclude that the balance favors the latter.
Weighing the Policy Considerations
An assessment of the correct interpretation of DR 5-105(D) re-
quires weighing the policy considerations favoring a strict rule disquali-
fying the law firm of a disqualified former government attorney against
those giving credence to the argument that the rule of disqualification
should be less than absolute. This section of the note will first examine
the various policy considerations in turn. The likelihood that a proce-
dure short of absolute disqualification would give effect to those consid-
erations will also be discussed. Then, to the extent that DR 9-101(B)
contemplates disqualification of a former government attorney only "in
a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employe," an examination will be made of what constitutes "substan-
tial responsibility" in a "matter." It will be seen that the rule of
disqualification can best be effectuated when "matter" is defined to
include not only a discrete set of facts involving an identifiable party but
also the situation where the attorney has drafted or interpreted a regula-
tion or law.38 Furthermore, the purpose of DR 9-101(3) will best be
served when "substantial responsibility" is interpreted to encompass
situations where an attorney has had any direct, personal, material
involvement in a matter.39
Policy Considerations Favoring Absolute Disqualification
The paramount policy consideration underlying the rule favoring
38. See notes 89-92 & accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 93-94 & accompanying text infra.
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absolute disqualification of the former government attorney, and thus of
his law firm, is the appearance of impropriety. It is this factor which
must be examined and weighed against the considerations favoring a
less stringent application of the rule.
Although there is considerable confusion concerning the weight to
be given the appearance of impropriety in determining if disqualification
is called for, it is incorrect to label it, as does the ABA opinion, 40 as
"only one of the underlying considerations"-on a level with confiden-
tiality, switching sides, and abuse of power. These "other considera-
tions" are in fact no more than manifestations of the appearance of
impropriety,41 and are not policy considerations in their own right in
regard to DR 9-101(B). Indeed, the location of DR 9-101 (B) under
Canon 9 adds weight to the argument that the appearance of impropriety
is the relevant consideration.4 2 Canon 9 states: "A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety." Ethical Consideration 9-3 sheds
further light on this principle:
After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment,
he should not accept employment in connection with any matter
in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving,
since to accept employment would give the appearance of im-
prorpiety even if none exists.
43
Thus, contrary to the position taken by its Ethics Committee's opinion
dealing with the law firms of disqualified former government attorneys,
the ABA apparently recognized that the appearance of impropriety is
the underlying consideration for DR 9-101(B) by situating this discipli-
nary rule under Canon 9 and by the expression of this exact concern in
Ethical Consideration 9-3.44
40. See ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 3.
41. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 648, 650
(2d Cir. 1974). The court there pointed out that the purpose behind DR 9-101(B) is
to avoid the possibility that a government employee's action was influenced by the hope
of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he had done. See also ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 37 (1931) (influenced by the possibil-
ity of later employment); Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons
of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REv. 657, 659-60 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Kaufman] (the attorney must avoid even the appearance of impropriety-he must not
appear both for and against the same party in the same controversy).
42. Contra, ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 3.
43. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
44. Additionally, to argue, as does ABA OPINION 342, that actual abuses of con-
fidence or switching of sides is the focus of DR 9-101(B) is to ignore the availability
of Canons 4 and 5, respectively, to deal with these problems. These problems are al-
ready dealt with adequately by these other canons and the ethical considerations and
disciplinary rules thereunder. To argue that DR 9-101(B) should be concerned pri-
marily with these arguments is to insist upon the redundancy of this rule. It would seem
that a purpose other than mere duplication of the proscriptions contained in other rules
should be served by this disciplinary rule.
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A careful factual analysis of each case is necessary to determine
whether the appearance of impropiety reasonably exists. "Vague or
indefinite allegations [of the appearance of impropriety] do not suffice.
Actual activities on specific cases . . . must be demonstrated which
would make it reasonable to infer [that the appearance of impropriety
actually exists]." 4 5 The analysis must focus not on vague allegations of
impropriety but on the existence of the elements expresed in the rule-
whether a particular matter is one in which the attorney now privately
employed had substantial responsibility while a government employee.
Such a factual determination will avoid the reliance on vague allega-
tions, for if the attorney did have substantial responsibility over the
matter, it is reasonable to infer that the appearance of impropriety is
present.
In order to weigh the policy considerations, it is necessary, how-
ever, to examine the meaning of the appearance of impropriety. This
poses a problem in that the concept is itself amorphous. It is therefore
easier and perhaps more instructive to examine the relevant manifesta-
tions of the appearance of impropriety as they exist with regard to
former government attorneys. For the purposes of this note, these
manifestations will be divided into three main categories: (1) the
appearance of the misuse of confidential information; (2) the "treache-
ry" of switching sides; and (3) the abuse of government power by the
attorney in its various forms. Each of these factors will be considered in
turn because each in part contributes to the single broad policy consider-
ation underlying disqualification.
The Potential Misuse of Confidential Information
Canon 4 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
states: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client." This principle is further enunciated in DR 4-101(B) which
provides with certain specified exceptions that an attorney shall not
knowingly:
( 1 ) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage
of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage
of himself or of a third person.
Ethical Consideration 4-6 makes clear the obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client continues after the termination of the
lawyer's employment.46
45. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
589 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
46. "The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his
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Under Canon 4, the courts have held that an attorney is disquali-
fied from representing his client in a proceeding upon showing that the
matter embraced by the pending suit is substantially related to a matter
in which the attorney previously represented a former client.4" The
client need not establish that confidences were actually reposed.48 The
rationale supporting the imposition of such a strict rule of disqualifica-
tion is the protection of the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client
relationship.49  Without such protection, a client might justifiably fear
that information revealed to his lawyer on one day might be used against
him on the next."0 Such a result cannot be condoned; our system of
justice requires that a client be able to discuss his problems freely and in
depth with his lawyer without fear of subsequent disclosure. Clients'
freedom to be fully forthright with their attorneys cannot be realized
without strict enforcement of the rule forbidding subsequent employ-
ment in a matter substantially related to the previous matter in which the
attorney represented the former client.5
Furthermore, this rule is not nullified by the fact that the sensitive
or confidential information to be disclosed is part of the public record or
available from another source. 52  Even if the information is readily
available elsewhere, upon a showing that the matters are substantially
related, the attorney will be disqualified under Canon 4.53 Proponents
of this broad application of the rule believe it is justified by the need to
avoid even the possibility of unfair or unethical use of confidential
information. 4
Indeed, to insure the free flow of information and to preclude the
unethical use of confidences or secrets, the courts and commentators
have consistently demanded more than disqualification of the individual
attorney alone. In the area of client confidences and secrets, when one
attorney in a firm is held disqualified from a matter due to its substantial
client continues after the termination of his employment. ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONsIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 4-6 (1975).
47. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1971); T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
48. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.,
216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209,
225 (N.D. Il. 1975); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
49. See American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir.
1971).
50. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 572; Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
53. Id.
54. See Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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relationship to a previous matter, disqualification has been extended to
all attorneys in the firm associated with the disqualified attorney.5 5 This
rule requiring disqualification of the firm cannot be circumvented by a
showing that confidences were not passed on by the attorney receiving
them."0  Such a limitation would place a heavy-perhaps impossible-
burden on the former client to establish that confidences were indeed
improperly handled by the firm. Furthermore, it must be remembered
that Canon 4 is as concerned with the possibility that confidences or
secrets may be misused as it is with actual proof that some misuse of
confidences has occured.57 Moreover, it has been held that steps taken
by a firm to insure that confidences would neither be passed on nor even
appear to be passed on by the disqualified attorney are ineffective in
warding off disqualification.58 Segregation of a disqualified partner, by
refusing him access to information and discussions on the matter and by
excluding him from participation in remuneration received by the firm,
is insufficient to prevent disqualification of the entire firm, no matter
how good the intentions of the firm.59 Furthermore, once a firm is
disqualified from a matter because of its substantial relationship to
matters in which an attorney in that firm previously represented a client
with an adverse interest, the firm may not cure its ineligibility through
dissolution of the partnership or dismissal of the attorney.60
The principles regarding confidences contained in Canon 4 appear
to relate directly to DR 9-101 (B), where the government is the "client."
However, because the need for preservation of confidences and for free
flow of information from client to attorney-may not be as compelling
when the attorney was formerly employed by the government, it must be
determined whether modification of these principles is in order.
At first blush, the government attorney does not have an identical
obligation of confidentiality to that of an attorney in private practice. 61
Optimally, our government is an open operation. Any citizen, including
an attorney employed by the government, should be allowed to question
55. See American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971);
Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955); W.
E. Bassett Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn. 1962); H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHics 106 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER].
56. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.
1955).
57. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973);
Fleischer v. A.A.P., 163 F. Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
58. See W. E. Bassett Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn.
1962).
59. Id. at 825.
60. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir.
1955).
61. See Draft Opinion, supra note 23, at 40.
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publicly the actions of the government, to "blow the whistle" on what
are perceived to be its inadequacies or abuses. These notions of openness,
however, must be tempered by the realization that the government
employee is not only a citizen but is also an attorney and as such, has a
duty of fidelity to his client. Certain information made known to the
attorney must remain confidential, at least to the extent that it should
not be used to benefit one private party at the expense of another or to
the benefit of a private party against the government. The information
obtained by an attorney while employed by the government should not
be revealed to aid or hinder the success of the litigation following the
employee's departure from public employment. In order for the gov-
ernment to function properly for the benefit of the public, and in order
for our legal system to maintain its integrity, information obtained by
the attorney while in government service must remain confidential.
Clearly, then, the preservation of confidences is equally of concern
to the former government attorney under DR 9-101(B), as it is to any
other attorney under the principles of Canon 4. Indeed, it is perhaps
even of greater import, since the focus under Canon 4 is whether the
activities of the private attorney will necessarily or even probably involve
the misuse of confidences or secrets of the former client, while under DR
9-101(B) the focus is on whether the activities of the former govern-
ment attorney will give rise to the appearance that Canon 4 may be
violated.12  The procedure employed under DR 9-101(B) must be
adequate to insure that this appearance of impropriety will not arise.
Applying the standard of the appearance of impropriety, if the
matter is one over which the attorney had substantial responsibility
while he was in government service, he will be disqualified from han-
dling the matter in his present private capacity. Such an application is
necessary to ensure against the appearance that the attorney has used
information with regard to a particular matter obtained during his
government employment either in an action against the government or
in an action between private parties. The question that remains, how-
ever, is whether the entire firm should be ineligible to handle the matter,
as is required by Canon 4 when confidences are potentially compro-
mised. Under Canon 4, where the focus is on possible misuse of
secrets or confidences, the courts have consistently held that concern for
a potential violation mandates that the firm must also be disqualified.63
The rule should be no different with regard to the law firm of a former
government attorney under DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D), when the
concern is with the appearance of impropriety. The disqualification of
only the individual attorney will not eliminate the appearance that
information may be misused, especially in light of the nature of relation-
62. See N.Y. Opinion 899, supra note 31, at 564.
63. See note 55 supra.
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ships within most law firms. The informality existing between members
who work and lunch together, and who are economically interested in
the firm's success, is such that information may be divulged either
inadvertently or otherwise. Even if such information were not divulged,
the appearance that it might be divulged remains. Clearly, disqualifica-
tion of the firm is as appropriate in dealing with prior government
attorneys under DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D) as it is under Canon
4.
Consideration must be given, however, to the possibility whether
direct action short of total disqualification of the entire firm-specifical-
ly, screening of the affected attorney-might sufficiently eliminate this
appearance of impropriety. Logic, however, seems to compel a conclu-
sion that screening cannot effectively eliminate the appearance that
confidences or secrets may be misused. The close personal relationships
within the law firms, previously alluded to, are such that regardless of
precautionary measures taken to ensure that the disqualified attorney
not involve himself in participation, discussion, or division of fees
attributable to the matter, the appearance that he might divulge the
information remains. Furthermore, even if a screening procedure effec-
tively assured that confidences had not and would not be misused, the
public might well not comprehend or accept the subtle complexities of
internal protections within the firm.
The Treachery of Switching Sides
Canon 5 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of a client." This concern is further enunciated in DR
5-105(A) and DR 5-105(B) which forbid the acceptance or continu-
ance of employment which would be likely to involve the attorney in
representing "differing interests," which are defined as including "every
interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a
lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or
other interest. ' 64 The result is a rule requiring the disqualification of
an attorney from employment in any matter requiring him to advocate a
position adverse to one previously expounded by him.65 The admoni-
tion expressed in this rule, which has its origins in Canon 666 of the
64. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Definitions (1975).
65. See E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376, 394 (S.D. Texas
1969); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETics, OPINIONS, No. 71 (1932); Kaufman,
supra note 41, at 660; Kaplan, Forbidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 914, 917-18
(1956).
66. Canon 6 provided:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests .... Within the meaning of
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former Canons of Professional Ethics, the precursor of the present
Code, is very closely related to and commonly confused with the rule
against disclosure of confidential information. It is clear, however, that
apart from and regardless of the existence of any attorney-client confi-
dences, the mere representation by an attorney of an interest adverse to
that of a former client is sufficient to warrant disqualification.17  If the
former client establishes that the attorney-client relationship did in fact
exist, the attorney will be precluded from representing an interest ad-
verse to that taken on behalf of his former client.6 And if the attorney
who formerly represented the client is disqualified, all members associat-
ed with him are likewise disqualified from the same matter. 9
The rule prohibiting the representation of adverse interests is
grounded in the desire-indeed in the necessity-to maintain public
confidence in the legal profession. A client must feel that his confi-
dence has not been betrayed; to allow an attorney to advocate an adverse
position would give the appearance of such a betrayal. This appearance
of betrayal would be amplified if the attorney were allowed to escape
disqualification on a showing that no confidential information was
reposed in the attorney, in that the former client, "a layman who has
reposed confidence and trust in his attorney, will feel that the attorney
has escaped on a technicality." o
With regard to former government attorneys, it is obvious that the
"appearance of impropriety" underlying DR 9-101(B) is analogous to
the concern for public confidence on which the rules against switching
sides are based. The standards should be no different for the attorney
whose previous "client" was the government. Although the government
agency itself may not feel betrayed by the attorney who leaves and takes
employment representing an interest adverse to that of the agency, the
public might well adjudge the agency to have been betrayed. Similarly,
it is reasonable to believe that the public will perceive the identical
appearance of impropriety if the attorney is disqualified but his firm is
allowed to represent the adverse interest.
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employ-
ment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
67. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1964); ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 83 (1932); id., No. 71 (1931); id., No. 33 (1931);
DRINKER, supra note 55, at 104, 109, 115 (1953); Kaufman, supra note 41, at 659-
60.
68. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1964).
69. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 103 (1933); id.,
No. 72 (1932); id., No. 33 (1931); DRINKER, supra note 55, at 106 (1953).
70. E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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The question, then, is whether any step short of absolute disqualifi-
cation of the firm will sufficiently dispel this appearance of impropriety.
The answer should be that the appearance of impropriety will remain.
The complexities of intrafirm protections are too subtle or too complex
for the layman to appreciate, with the result that the public may not be
convinced that the government's trust was not betrayed.
Improper Handling of Government Office to Encourage
Future Employment
When a government attorney accepts subsequent private employ-
ment in the same matter for which he had substantial responsibility
while a government employee, the appearance of improper handling of
an employee's position may arise in at least three different forms. 71 First,
the attorney may appear to handle his government responsibility improp-
erly for the purpose of ingratiating himself to a potential employer. 2
Second, it is possible the attorney may appear to abuse his government
office in order to obtain discovery or other advantages not available to a
private party for use against a potential opponent in private litigation.7 3
Third, the attorney may appear to abuse his government employment
by taking a position which may have the effect of creating subsequent
private employment for himself, in representing a party either challeng-
ing or seeking to uphold the position taken.
7 4
The first situation occurs when the attorney has been hired by a
firm with which he had dealings in his government position. Concern
may arise as to whether his previous actions on behalf of the government
were influenced by a desire to curry favor with a potential employer. It
does not matter whether promises were actually made, or even hinted at,
by the firm; the pressure upon the attorney to make a favorable impres-
sion remains. More important, the public recognizes this pressure and
the appearance of impropriety is again of concern.
71. See Draft Opinion, supra note 23, at 41. This appearance of improper
handling of the government employee's position or power is a problem peculiar to the
area of former government attorneys. Unlike the two prior concerns, it is not dealt
with by a separate canon or disciplinary rule of the code.
72. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND FEDERAL SERVIcE 233 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CONFLICT OF INTEREST]. See also
Draft Opinion, supra note 23, at 41.
73. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1976);
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 135 (1936); Draft Opinion, su-
pra note 23, at 41.
74. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1976);
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 648 (2d Cir. 1974); Allied
Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 469 (D. Minn. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO.
37 (1936).
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The second situation arises because of the powers or perceived
powers of the government official. An investigation by a government
official carried out ostensibly in the exericse of official authority may
carry with it a sense of coercion or respect for actual or supposed power;
persons cooperating with the government investigator may disclose in-
formation inimical to their best interests with no thought that it would
later be used in a civil action. 5 Thus, there may arise an appearance of
impropriety that the former government official now employed privately
in the same matter may have misused his powers for his own future
benefit in subsequent private employment.
The third manner in which an appearance of impropriety may arise
occurs when the reason for the attorney's position on a matter while in
government service is called into question. Private employment in the
matter may lead to the charge that his actions while in government
service were influenced by the possibility of creating a controversy or
uncertainty which would result in future employment for himself. 6 The
motives underlying his position will be impugned simply by his accepta-
nce of subsequent private employment which places him in a position
either to attack or rely on that previous stance.
Because of the appearance of impropriety which may arise in each
of these situations, DR 9-101(B) requires that the former government
attorney be disqualified from later private employment in the same
matter. Once it has been determined that disqualification of the attor-
ney is warranted, it is also necessary to disqualify the firm, for the
appearance of impropriety spills over from the individual attorney to his
firm. Certainly the suspicion that a former government attorney has
attempted to ingratiate himself with a potential employer will not be
dispelled if the firm employing him continues representation in a matter
in which the attorney is "sidelined." Rather, it will appear that the
attorney has been rewarded with employment for his "effort" on behalf
of the employer. Disqualification is definitely of no help in this area
when it extends only to the individual attorney. Likewise, individual
disqualification is of no service when the suspicion raised is that the
attorney abused his government power to obtain discovery or other
advantage over the opposing party in the later private litigation. The
informal nature of the relationships within the firm, coupled with the
economic and social pressures, sustain the suspicion that improprieties
might occur in passing on the necessary information, even though the
impropriety may be inadvertent.
The most difficult problem in this area is the possibility that the
former government employee might have taken a position on a matter
75. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 816 (5th Cir. 1976);
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 135 (1936).
76. See note 74 supra.
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with the intent that the position taken would create future employment
for him. At best, such a charge is difficult to prove or disprove. And
if the attorney's firm is allowed to continue with its representation in the
matter, the appearance is compounded by the fact that the end is
apparently accomplished. The firm remains employed to uphold, upset,
or interpret the position advocated by the employee while in the govern-
ment. The attorney's own disqualification in the matter does not dispel
doubts as to his position previously taken. The financial benefits of the
present employment are rewards in themselves.
Screening the attorney, in order to isolate him from any participa-
tion in the matter or from sharing the fees attributable to it, is again of
little use. Screening has no relevance to a charge that the employee
attempted to ingratiate himself to the potential employer while in gov-
ernment service. Nor does screening have relevance to the suspicion
that the position taken on the matter was influenced by the potential for
future employment in relation to the same matter. His employment by
the firm may appear to be directly attributable to the position taken by
him, as it may appear to constitute a reward from the firm for the
employment created for it. Or his employment may simply appear to be
due to openings created in the firm due to the increased workload
brought about by the position taken by the attorney.
Finally, where the concern is that the attorney may have abused the
powers inherent in his position as a government employee in acquiring
information or other advantage, screening will also be ineffective. The
nature of a law firm is such that the appearance of impropriety will
arise.
Policy Factors Favoring a Narrow Construction of the
Rule of Disqualification
Three factors, the appearance of misuse of confidential informa-
tion, the treachery of switching sides, and the abuse of government
power, all related to the appearance of impropriety, have been shown to
militate for an absolute rule disqualifying the law firm of a disqualified
former government attorney. There are several factors, however, which
point toward a less strict rule and which support the qualified approach
taken by the ABA and New York opinions. These include: (1)
restraints on the government attorneys' future private employment; (2)
restraints imposed on government recruitment of attorneys; and (3)
disqualification as a tool for depriving an opponent of competent coun-
sel or counsel of choice.
Restraints on the Government Attorney's Future
Private Employment
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) prohibits a former government em-
ployee from accepting "private employment in a matter in which he had
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substantial responsibility" while publicly employed, thereby imposing
direct limitations on the attorney's future employment. In determining
the extent to which DR 9-101(B) is going to be enforced against the
individual attorney and, through DR 5-105(D), against the attorney's
entire firm, it is necessary to keep in mind this potential restraint on a
former government attorney's ability to earn a living.7" The extent to
which the rule is enforced depends in part on the extent to which
restraints on future employment will be tolerated. The former govern-
ment attorney must not by virtue of an unnecessarily harsh ethical
precept be prevented from later earning a living in private practice. The
question is to what extent the rule disqualifying former government
attorneys and their firms will lead to such a result.
The restrictions upon the private employment of a former govern-
ment attorney enunciated in DR 9-101(B) are themselves substantial.
However, when combined with DR 5-105(D), which, if interpreted
strictly, requires disqualification of all attorneys in a firm employing a
disqualified former government attorney, the restrictions of DR 9-
101(B) are greatly magnified. Due to the potential loss of business
which may occur if a firm is disqualified in all matters from which a
former government attorney is disqualified, firms may become reluctant
to hire government attorneys. The reluctance will most likely vary from
firm to firm depending on the extent of work each does for clients
relating to matters similar to those before the government. Thus, it
seems likely that the firms with the greatest reluctance to hire former
government attorneys will be those with the greatest amount of work in
the government area, either before government agencies or defending
clients in government suits. Such firms will also probably be those
which had previously hired the greatest number of former government
attorneys because of such attorneys' experience and expertise in the area
of their former employment. Thus, application of an absolute rule
requiring disqualification of the entire firm will probably be more
damaging to the future employment prospects of government attorneys
than a more limited rule. Accordingly, screening must be considered as
a necessary compromise in minimizing the restrictions on future employ-
ment while at the same time attempting to eliminate as much as possible
the appearance of impropriety.
Before assuming, however, that screening is the only acceptable
solution to this problem, other considerations must be brought to light.
First, the harshness of the rule, even assuming a strict interpretation of
DR 5-105(D) requiring disqualification of the firm, is questionable in
light of the fact that the restriction upon private employment established
77. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.
1955); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975).
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by DR 9-101 (B) is narrowly confined to a specific area. 78  The attor-
ney is only prevented from accepting private employment in a matter over
which he had substantial responsibility while a government employee.
The former government attorney is not faced with an outright ban on
dealing with the government, or on practicing in the specialized area in
which he worked while in the government. Rather, he is restricted only
as to those matters in which he previously had substantial responsibility,
and the firm is likewise disqualified only as to those same matters. The
attorney and the firm may continue to represent the client in all other
matters. However, the possibility exists that a former government
attorney may experience difficulty in obtaining employment with certain
firms following his government service. Through an excess of caution,
some firms may refuse to employ former government attorneys who
worked for an agency with which such firms regularly deal; some may
even refuse to hire former government officials entirely. But such cases
should be exceptions to the general rule, especially if there are legitimate
advantages to hiring former government attorneys, such as an attorney's
familiarity with agency procedure or his expertise in a specialized area
of law. If such legitimate advantages indeed exist, firms will not pass
up the opportunity to employ former government attorneys. The firms
will strive to develop procedures which minimize the possibility of
disqualification in order to both retain their clients and hire qualified
attorneys. Indeed, there are presently proscriptions applying to attor-
neys in private practice who wish to change employment. For example,
Canons 4 and 5 deal respectively with confidential information and
representing differing interests. In order to avoid violation of these
ethical precepts, a firm must either inquire of the potential employee
what matters he has dealt with which may preclude his taking part in the
firm's business or it must take the risk of being disqualified in those
matters. For such a firm to make the same inquiry of former govern-
ment attorneys would not seem to be a significant burden. A thorough
inquiry into the matters handled by the potential employee and a
comparison of those with the matters presently handled by the firm and
clients presently represented should alleviate harshness, in that firms will
establish no blanket restrictions on the hiring of former government
attorneys, but rather will simply not hire those whose association with
the firm could result in too many disqualifications.
79
78. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
79. It must be recognized, however, that in some instances the inquiry will be
less than successful due to the confidential nature of the matters which are being ex-
plored. In addition to matters which the attorney has dealt with in the public view,
confidential discussions and investigations within the agency may lead to disqualifica-
tion of the attorney in those matters. An inquiry as to these matters is not possible,
and the risk of disqualification (and therefore the restraint on employment) is increased.
1559July 1977]
Furthermore, other avenues of future employment remain open to
the government attorney. An attorney employed in a high level supervi-
sorial position who may have had substantial responsibility over a great
number of matters could become a law professor or could seek employ-
ment as in-house counsel to a commercial concern which requires
someone with his background but which has not appeared before him in
his government capacity in a matter which is still pending. Such
employment could be sought on a permanent basis or with the interest
of maintaining sharpness in an area of specialization until it is possible
to return to practice with a private law firm. Eventually most matters
within which the attorney had substantial responsibility will no longer be
contested and loss of business due to disqualification will no longer
preclude firms from hiring the attorney. The government attorney may
also take advantage of his skills acquired in government service by
working in the same general area but with a slightly different focus. For
example, he may continue to work in the antitrust field but may find it
necessary to represent computer manufacturers or automobile dealers,
rather than motion picture distributors or telephone interconnect equip-
ment suppliers.
Also, should the attorney be unable to obtain suitable employment
with a firm, he may, if he wishes, go into practice by himself. Such a
possibility would perhaps be most viable for an upper level government
employee whose disqualification may extend to a great number of areas
but who would also have the expertise and the reputation which would
attract clients. As a sole practitioner, such an attorney can more easily
avoid client conflicts than as a member of a large firm.
The restraints, then, on government attorney's future employment
are less severe than they are often argued to be. Much of a former
government attorney's field of expertise is left open to him in private
practice, and there are other opportunities for employment. Conceded-
ly, these solutions will not satisfy the desires of all attorneys considering
government service, but they do emphasize the less severe nature of the
restraints on future private employment.
Restraints Upon Government Recruitment of Attorneys
The second policy consideration favoring a narrow rule of disquali-
fication, arising as a direct consequence of the restraints on future
employment, is the difficulty which the government will experience in
recruiting qualified attorneys whose future employment after govern-
ment service is severely limited. Attorneys will be reluctant to enter
government service if the prospects of employment upon leaving are
limited. 0 Thus, the restrictions on a former government attorney's
80. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Kaufman, supra note 41; CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 72, at 224.
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future employment discussed above may well inhibit government re-
cruitment of qualified attorneys as well.
It is by no means a foregone conclusion, however, that restraints on
later employment do in fact restrict government recruitment. Certainly
all attorneys do not enter government employ with the intent of leaving
in two or three years, or even ten or fifteen. Many attorneys are
sufficiently committed to government service so that the possible re-
straints on future private employment do not outweigh the benefits of
present government employment. Furthermore, there is no reason to
conclude automatically that restraints upon future employment will
affect the quality of attorney the government is able to recruit. So long
as the restraints on future employment are not unduly harsh, competent
attorneys will be available,8' though perhaps in lesser numbers.
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that a rule which merely
discourages those whose intent was to remain in government employ-
ment for only a short time is more beneficial than harmful. Advantages
are to be gained if employees stay with the government for a longer
time. A decrease in the turnover rate will partially free the government
from its need to recruit new employees and to train them. The level of
expertise within the government will necessarily rise if attorneys stay in
government service and advance through the ranks.
Concededly, other problems may arise. The agencies may be more
"isolated" from private practice and therefore from divergent opinions
and viewpoints. But this danger should not be too great considering the
amount of contact the attorney will have with outside interests and
considering that the top positions in most agencies and departments will
continue to be given to political appointees who will bring their own
viewpoints to the agency.
Disqualification as Deprivation of Competent
Counsel or Counsel of Choice
In stating the policy considerations favoring a narrow interpreta-
tion of the rule for disqualification of a former government attorney's
law firm, the ABA formal opinion lists as two considerations the possi-
bility that disqualification may serve as "a mere tool enabling a litigant
to improve his prospects by depriving his opponent of competent coun-
sel" and the fact that the rule may "interfere needlessly with the right of
litigants to obtain competent counsel of their own choosing."8" It is
easier to examine these two factors together in that they address the
same issue. One speaks of total deprivation of counsel while the other
81. See CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 72, at 160.
82. ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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speaks to counsel of choice. The first is merely a more extreme instance
of the latter.
Deprivation of counsel of the party's choice has been of frequent
concern,83 for "the more frequently a litigant is delayed or otherwise
disadvantaged by the unnecessary disqualification of his attorney . . .
the greater the likelihood of public suspicion of both the bar and the
judiciary. ' '1 4  Disqualification of counsel is indeed a necessary and
useful tool, but is subject to misuse. Even when applied properly, the
disqualification may serve to deprive the client of the counsel of his
choice. Furthermore, disqualification may not only lead to deprivation
of counsel of choice but also to deprivation of competent counsel
altogether in narrow, specialized areas, especially where one litigant is
large and powerful and can dominate the market for the available
firms."5
Another related concern is that disqualification may be used as a
hindering and delaying tactic or that the result may be harsh and costly
to the client. This is especially true when the motion to disqualify does
not come until the litigation or other proceeding has advanced to a point
where considerable time and expense have been invested by both client
and attorney, or where an attorney-client relationship is sufficiently
longstanding to make a change of attorneys both economically and
emotionally difficult. A rule requiring disqualification in such situa-
tions may be unduly harsh, economically injuring the client and destroy-
ing his confidence in the legal system.86
The possibility of such hardship can, however, be minimized by
appropriate employment procedures instituted by the firms. Even as-
suming that the disqualification extends to the firm as well as to the
particular former government attorney, disqualification will occur only
83. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
757 (2d Cir. 1975); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle
Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973); Laskey Bros. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955).
84. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 801, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
85. See Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. In the majority of cases in which the question may arise, the possible disqual-
ification will be discovered early in the proceeding, preferably before the attorney is
hired or the client is taken on. In those instances where the violation of DR 9-101 (B)
is not timely discovered, but comes to light in an advanced stage of a proceeding, the
efficacy of disqualification may be outweighed by the considerable harshness of the
remedy and the burden on the client. Disqualification in such a situation might be
more unfavorable to the profession in the public eye than the continuance of the pro-
ceeding with proper screening precautions taken to eliminate as much as possible the
appearance of impropriety otherwise present. Such a decision to continue the proceed-
ing is within the discretionary powers of the court. However, such a decision to con-
tinue with the attorney properly screened should not absolve the firm of culpability
in a later disciplinary proceeding.
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as to those matters over which the attorney had substantial responsibili-
ty.8 7 The goal, then, is to ascertain those areas of potential disqualifica-
tion before the attorney is hired. This may be accomplished by ascer-
taining those matters in which the attorney will be disqualified and
determining if they relate to any matters presently among the firm's
business. Likewise, when a client approaches the firm for representa-
tion, the firm must inquire as to the nature of the representation and the
issues and facts involved, in order to determine if these matters are
similar to matters for which any attorney presently with the firm had
substantial responsibility as a government employee. Again, the ma-
jority of conflicts which would cause disqualification should come to
light after such an inquiry. When the firm becomes aware of potential
conflicts it should inform the client immediately, providing the client
with the necessary information to make an informed choice whether to
continue with the representation in light of the danger of disqualifica-
tion. When confronted with actual conflicts, the firm should inform the
client and immediately disqualify itself.88
Such a process is, of course, burdensome and hardly foolproof. Yet
it is perhaps neither more burdensome nor less foolproof than the
procedures which firms should presently employ in light of other ethical
considerations when accepting new clients or new matters from present
clients. It is already necessary for the firms to determine that conflicts
do not arise in other areas, for example under Canons 4 and 5 dealing
respectively with preservation of confidences and representing differing
interests. Requiring such an examination in the area of former govern-
ment attorneys, then, should not require a firm to establish an entirely
new procedure but rather would merely supplement what should already
be an established procedure.
Perhaps the firms will be required to train more of their own
attorneys rather than relying on the government as a tuition free training
school. But such a requirement should not lower the level of expertise
within the firms. It would necessitate only that the firms bear the brunt
of such training costs, rather than the public.
We have seen, therefore, that the possibility of depriving an oppo-
nent of counsel is a very real concern but that procedures instituted by
the firms may alleviate the potential injury to the legal profession in this
area. As under the two previous considerations, this concern is less
important than has been urged.
87. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
88. ABA Opinion 342 went so far as to state that a lawyer has an ethical duty
to "resolve all doubts against the acceptance of questionable employment." ABA OPIN-
ION 342, supra note 10, at 12, citing ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImLITY, Ethi-
cal Considerations 5-15, 5-16 (1975). See also N.Y. Opinion 899, supra note 31, at 571.
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Limitations on the Application of DR 9-101(B)
Before balancing the various policy considerations previously dis-
cussed to arrive at the proper rule to apply as to the disqualification of
firms, it is necessary to examine one more factor: the wording and
meaning of DR 9-101(B). The framers of DR 9-101(B) apparently
attempted to avoid confusion by defining exactly what acts lead to
disqualification. In so doing, the authors hoped to promulgate a rule
that could be applied with precision.
The "Same Matter"
Under the present rule, the attorney will not be disqualified unless
the pending employment is in regard to the same "matter" in which he
had "substantial responsibility" while a government employee.
Although the term "matter" has not yet been given a precise
definition, it is not difficult to see that the term certainly comprehends at
the least "a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions
between identifiable parties." 89  This definition would encompass the
same proceeding or litigation. An issue of fact involving the same
parties in a similar situation or concerning similar conduct would also
appear to come within this definition.90
But to be effective the definition must not be too limited. It would
appear that where the government employee has drafted, interpreted, or
passed upon the validity of a regulation or law, the policies underlying
DR 9-101(B) would not be served unless the attorney is prohibited
from accepting private employment which would involve either an
attack on the validity of, or support for, the previous act.9 Although
such a rule must not be carried too far, it would seem obvious that the
appearance of impropriety would arise as readily from an attorney's
attack on his previous interpretation of a regulation as from his attack
on a previous application by him of that regulation to a given fact
situation. In both instances, he is being called upon to impugn his
previous actions as a public official. "2  Furthermore, too narrow an
interpretation will not serve the purpose of eliminating the appearance of
impropriety arising from the possible use of confidential information.
The appearance that confidential information may be misused will surely
arise where the fact issues and the parties are the same in the prior and
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 6 n.20.
91. See N.Y. Opinion 899, supra note 31. Contra, ABA OPINION 342, supra note
10, at 6.
92. The appearance of impropriety would be no less if the attorney were support-
ing the position previously taken. Either procedure raises the question whether the
previous position was influenced by the possibility of future employment.
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subsequent proceedings, or where the same litigation is involved. It
might also be noted that to allow the attorney to accept private employ-
ment in a matter challenging or upholding the validity of a regulation
which he drafted or analyzed while in his government position may also
give rise to this appearance, since the challenge or support may be based
in part on information made available to him in his former
employment-or, at least, so the public might reasonably believe.
Nonetheless, restricting the application of DR 9-101(B) to situa-
tions where the former government attorney's previous association was
with regard to the "same matter" serves a useful purpose. The pro-
scribed area of future employment is thereby narrowed and much of the
harshness which might otherwise result from firm disqualification is
alleviated.
Substantial Responsibility
The disqualification of a firm will also be limited under DR 9-
101(B) to instances where a former government attorney had "substan-
tial responsibility" in a former matter. What constitutes "substantial
responsibility" is somewhat difficult to determine. Under Canon 36 of
the former Canons of Professional Ethics, the provision from which the
current DR 9-101(B) is descended, the test was whether the subsequent
employment was in a matter which the attorney had "investigated or
passed upon" while in government office. Considerable confusion
arose under this standard as to what knowledge was to be "imputed" to
the attorney from those working in the same office or agency or, in the
case of an agency head or supervisory official, from those working under
him. The test under DR 9-101 (B), however, is whether the attorney
had "substantial responsibility" in a matter while a government employ-
ee. The question of knowledge, either actual or imputed, is not an
express requisite under the rule. The rule "contemplates a responsibili-
ty requiring the official to become personally involved to an important,
material degree, in the investigative or deliberate processes regarding the
transactions or facts in question." 3  Thus, DR 9-101(B) prevents an
overly broad area of disqualification, and thereby effectuates those
policy considerations favoring a narrow rule, by assuring that disqualifi-
cation can occur only where the appearance is the strongest.
Application of the rule, however, is not limited to the one attorney
who has primary responsibility for a matter. Although the requirement
of substantial responsibility does require more than a perfunctory ap-
proval or disapproval of a matter, a supervisory official or agency head
may also have sufficient responsibility so as to be disqualified from later
93. ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at 9.
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employment in the same matter. If the supervisory official or agency
head had a heavy responsibility for a matter in question, it would appear
unlikely that he did not become personally involved to a considerable
extent in the investigative or deliberative processes relating to that
matter.94 Again, given the presence of a strong personal involvement in
the matter, the appearance of impropriety is certain to arise. The
supervisory official or agency head must therefore be disqualified from
engaging in private employment in the same matter. The interpretation
of the rule in this manner effectuates the concern for the appearance of
impropriety but minimizes the area in which the attorney will be dis-
qualified.
Balancing the Considerations: Conclusion
In the final analysis, whether or not the law firm of a disqualified
former government attorney should itself be disqualified depends upon a
balancing of those policy considerations favoring absolute disqualifica-
tion against those considerations which support a more limited rule of
disqualification.
Paramount weight has been given, and must be given, to the
necessity of avoiding the appearance of impropriety 5 Public confi-
dence in the legal profession is at stake." The legal profession, in order
to retain public confidence, must be as conscious of potential violations
of ethical principles and the resulting appearance of impropriety as it is
of actual occurences of impropriety.
This is not to say that practical considerations do not carry consid-
erable weight. Balanced against the appearance of impropriety are
several factors: the possible restraint on the government's ability to
recruit; the restrictions on the government attorney's future employ-
ment; and the possible deprivation of counsel. These practical consid-
erations, all of which militate against absolute disqualification of the
firm, have been shown to be of a lesser significance, owing to the narrow
scope of the proscription of DR 9-101(B) and the alternatives available
to the attorney, the firm, the government, and the client. Furthermore,
when dealing with Canon 4 (preserving confidences) and Canon 5
(representing differing interests), two of those same practical considera-
tions-possible deprivation of counsel and restrictions on future em-
94. Id.
95. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
759 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, C.J. concurring); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568,
572 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574-75 (2d
Cir. 1973); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d
920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954).
96. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
759 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, C.J., concurring).
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ployment-are also present, and as to both, the ethical considerations
have been found to outweigh these practical concerns. Such practical
considerations are entitled to no greater weight with regard to former
government attorneys. Nor does the additional consideration applicable
to such attorneys-the effect on government recruitment-add sufficient
weight to the argument against absolute disqualification.
Moreover, screening would not serve to retain public confidence in
the legal profession; for even with screening the appearance of impropri-
ety remains. The appearance remains due to the "close, informal
relationship among law partners and associates and upon the incentives,
financial and otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely
among themselves when the information relates to existing employ-
ment." 7 Assertions or proof that no impropriety has in fact occurred
are irrelevant when the concern, as here, is with the appearance of
impropriety.
When dealing with ethical principles, however, it is important that
"we . . . not paint with broad strokes." 8 The facts of each case must
be examined before a conclusion on disqualification can be reached. But
once the decision to disqualify an attorney has been reached, disqualifi-
cation of his law firm should follow as a matter of course. The absolute
disqualification of the firm does not violate the admonition to not paint
with broad strokes if the factual examination by the court90 has taken
place in the first instance with regard to the attorney's disqualification.
If, through this examination, it is determined that the appearance of
impropriety will arise if the attorney is not disqualified, any action short
of disqualification of the firm will not dispel .that appearance. Disquali-
fication of the firm is justified, then, after an examination of the facts of
the individual case determines that the attorney should be disqualified.
Finally, an examination of the facts, to determine if a former
government attorney's present employment involves the same matter for
which the attorney had substantial responsibility while a government
employee, avoids disqualification based on vague allegations of the
97. ABA OPINION 342, supra note 10, at I n.2. See also ABA COMM. ON PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 169 (1967); id., No. 103 (1933); id., No. 72 (1932);
id., No. 50 (1931); id., No. 49 (1931); id., No. 33 (1931); Note, Unchanging Rules
in Changing Times. The Canons of Ethics and Intra-firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE
L.J 1058, 1061 (1964).
98. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
99. The final determination regarding disqualification in a court proceeding will
be left to the court. Where a court is not involved, as in negotiations between a private
firm and a government agency, the decision to disqualify should be left to the agency,
with normal administrative appeals procedures preserved. Leaving the final authority
to disqualify in the hands of the agency or the court, however, does not relieve the
affected firm of the duty to determine on its own whether disqualification is necessary,
and if so, to disqualify itself.
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appearance of impropriety. If such present employment in fact involves
a matter in which the attorney had substantial responsibility, it is
reasonable to believe that the public will perceive the existence of an
appearance of impropriety.
Disqualification of a law firm under this procedure will prevent a
loss of confidence in the legal profession, while at the same time not
unduly hindering government recruitment, future employment, or availa-
bility of counsel. Any process short of absolute disqualification of the
disqualified former government attorney's firm will not serve the very
ethical principles which constitute the profession's paramount concern.
Richard F. Luther*
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